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Abstract
In this thesis we study two different non-cooperative two-person games.
First, we study a zero-sum game played by players I and II on a n× n
random matrix, where the entries are iid standard normally distributed
random variables. Given the realization of the matrix, player I chooses
a row i and player II a column j. The entry at position (i, j) represents
the winnings and losings of the players. Let p = [p1, ..., pn]T denote the
optimal strategy of player I. We show that P
(
maxi∈[n] pi > c√n
)
→0 as
n→∞ for any c > 10√pi (1 +√2 log 4)√log 4.
The other game studied here is a spatial game in which each player,
represented by a vertex in a given graph, plays the repeated prisoner’s
dilemma game against its neighbors. At time one, each player chooses
a strategy at random independently of each other. At time t = 2, 3, ...,
each player, looking at its neighborhood (including the player itself), uses
the strategy of the player that scored highest in the previous round. We
study the game played on some deterministic graphs. For certain graphs
and choices of the parameters of the game, we find the probability that
a given player cooperates as time tends to infinity. We also analyze the
iterated prisoner’s dilemma played on the binomial random graph. In
particular, we study the asymptotic distribution of cooperation when the
number of players tends to infinity. More precisely, if n stands for the
numbers of players and r is the probability that two players play against
each other, we show that asymptotically almost surely (a.a.s.) coopera-
tion dies out if r = 1nc , c < 1, whereas it survives a.a.s. in the largest
component if r = λ lognn and λ = λ(n) ≤ 16 such that λ log n → ∞ as
n→∞.
Keywords: zero-sum game, optimal strategy, random matrix, iterated
prisoner’s dilemma, spatial game, cooperation, deterministic graph, bi-
nomial random graph.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Game Theory is a branch of applied mathematics originally related to
economical and political problems. In its origins, John von Neumann
and Oskar Morgenstern intended to study human behavior when making
strategic decisions. The assumption was that these decisions were based
on rationality. Nowadays Game Theory is related to other areas such as
ecology and biology, in particular related to evolution. In these areas,
the individuals behavior does not rely on rationality but on other aspects
such as fitness and natural selection.
In Game Theory, the decisions makers are called players [10]. Typical
objects of study are games called Two-person games. The players, player
I and player II, have a choice to make, and each player’s score depends
on its own choice and the choice of the other player [9]. If the players’
actions are independent, then the game is called non-cooperative. A
very simple description of a non-cooperative two-person game is given
by (SI , SII , AI , AII), where
1. SI is a nonempty set, the set of possible moves of player I;
2. SII is a nonempty set, the set of possible moves of player II;
3. AI and AII are the score functions (real valued functions) defined
on SI × SII .
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This way to describe the game is known as the "Strategic Form" [10].
The interpretation is as following: at the same time and without having
information about the other player’s choice, player I chooses sI ∈ SI and
player II chooses sII ∈ SII , resulting in that player I wins AI(sI , sII)
and player II wins AII(sI , sII). When the total score to both players
adds to zero, i.e. AI(sI , sII) = −AII(sI , sII) for all sI ∈ SI , sII ∈ SII ,
the game is called a zero-sum game. Two-person zero-sum games are
also known as matrix games, because the scores can be represented by
a matrix. If SI = {sI,1, ..., sI,n} and SII = {sII,1, ..., sII,m}, then the
matrix
X =
 x11 · · · x1m... ...
xn1 · · · xnm

is the Payoff matrix of the game, with
xij = AI(sI,i, sII,j) = −AII(sI,i, sII,j).
The matrix is known to both players. Player I chooses a row, i (sI,i),
and player II chooses a column, j (sI,i); then player II pays xij to player
I if xij > 0 or player I pays |xij | to player II if xij < 0.
We distinguish between pure strategies and mixed strategies. Pure strate-
gies for player I (II) are just deterministic choices of a move or element
of SI (SII). In a mixed strategy p = [p1, ..., pn]T (q = [q1, ..., qn]T ) for
player I (II), each element pi (qj) is a probability, so that when I (II)
makes its choice of move, it does so according to these probabilities:
move sI,i (sII,j) is chosen with probability pi (qj). Mixed strategies are
also known as randomized strategies. According to the well-known Min-
imax Theorem of von Neumann and Morgenstern there exist a number
V , called the value of the game, and mixed strategies p = [p1, ..., pn]T
and q = [q1, ..., qn]T , called optimal strategies or minimax strategies, for
both players respectively. These strategies have the following properties:
when player I plays p then its expected winnings are at least V indepen-
dently of what player II plays, and if player II plays q then its expected
loses are at most V [1]. A central issue in Game Theory is the study
of the optimal strategies. In this sense, Jonasson in [1] analyzed the
optimal strategies p = [p1, ..., pn]T and q = [q1, ..., qn]T of a two-person
zero-sum game played on a random n×n-matrix X = [Xij ]1≤i,j≤n, where
the Xij ’s are iid normally distributed random variables. More precisely,
3the author shows that if Z is the number of rows in the support of the
optimal strategy for player I given the realization of the matrix, then
there exists a < 12 such that
P
((
1
2
− a
)
n < Z <
(
1
2
+ a
)
n
)
→ 1,
as n→∞. It is also shown that EZ = (12 + o(1))n. In Chapter 2, we
study the same game, establishing a result about the maximal probability
assigned to a row/column in the optimal strategy. More precisely, we find
that for any c > 10
√
pi
(
1 +
√
2 log 4
)√
log 4,
P
(
max
i∈[n]
pi >
c√
n
)
→0,
as n→∞.
The second part of this thesis concerns a model introduced by Lindgren
and Nordahl [3], in which the well-known "Prisoner’s dilemma" is studied
in a spatial setting. Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher stated the Pris-
oner’s dilemma for first time in 1950. However, the "prisoner’s dilemma"
name was given by Albert W. Tucker who formalized the game using a
payoff matrix to describe it [13]. The following is the prisoner’s dilemma:
two suspects are arrested by the police. The police offers the same deal
to each prisoner. If one testifies against the other (defects) and the other
remains silent (cooperates), the defector goes free and the cooperator
gets a 5-year sentence. If both prisoners cooperate, each of them receive
a 1-year sentence. If each prisoner testifies against the other, each re-
ceives a 3-years sentence. This means that there are only two actions
for each prisoner, to defect (D) or to cooperate (C). What should the
prisoners do? Assuming that each prisoner wants only to minimize his
own time in prison, then the best action to take is to defect, whatever
the other prisoner does. On the other hand, it is clear that if the two
prisoners were to act for their common good, they should cooperate.
This need of choice between defection and cooperation is present in many
social and biological contexts. In fact, the prisoner’s dilemma is present
at all levels, as explained by Nowak in [4]: "Replicating molecules had
to cooperate to form the first cells. Single cells had to cooperate to form
the first multicellular organisms. The soma cells of the body cooperate
4 1. Introduction
and help the cells of the germ line to reproduce. Animals cooperates
to form social structures... Humans cooperate on large scale, giving
raise to cities, states and countries. Cooperation allows specialization.
Nobody needs to know everything. But cooperation is always vulnerable
to exploitation by defectors."
Lindgren and Nordahl model the evolution of cooperation in a spatial
setting: each player, associated with a vertex in a given graph, plays
the prisoner’s dilemma game against its neighbors. In their work, the
authors made simulations in order to understand the behavior of coop-
eration as the game is played repeatedly. In this thesis, we establish
some rigorous results concerning the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. Here
the game is played with the following rules: (i) at time 0 each player
chooses independently strategy C with probability p, and strategy D
with probability 1− p = q; (ii) at time t = 1, 2, ... each player plays the
game against its neighbors; (iii) at time t = 2, 3, ... each player, looking
at its own neighborhood (the player itself and its neighbors), uses the
same strategy as the player with highest score at time t − 1. For each
player, the payoff matrix of a single game is
(C D
C 1 0
D b a
)
with 0 < a < 1, 1 < b < 2, a+b ≤ 2. We are interested in the probability
that cooperation survives as the game is played repeatedly, in particular
that a given player i survives as a cooperator as t→∞. More formally,
we study the limit pip(C) = limt→∞ P (sit = C), where sit stands for the
strategy used by player i at time t. The structure of the population
is determined by different graphs, characterized by vertices and edges,
which represents players and interactions respectively. In Chapter 3
we study some deterministic graphs, in which there are infinitely many
players and the number of neighbors is equal for all players. Examples
of such graphs are trees, d-dimensional lattices, etc. In most cases pip(C)
depends on the parameters a and b. We study for each graph, as it
is possible, the evolution of cooperation for different values of a and b.
However, there are cases that pip(C) is independent of a and b. One such
case is the one-dimensional lattice, where each player plays against its
5two neighbors. We show in this case that
pip(C) =
(
q + p2
)2
p3 (3− 2p) .
But this is just the special case of the n−1-nary tree, in which each player
plays the game against its n neighbors, for which given the conditions
a+ (n− 1)b ≤ n and (n− 1)a+ b > n− 1, we show that
pip(C) = pn+1xn(n−1)
(
1− pn−1x2−3n+n2
)n
−pxn
((
1− pnx(n−2)n
)n − 1) ,
where x = p+ q(1− pn−1).
In Chapter 4 we study the iterated prisoner’s dilemma played on a
random graph known as the binomial random graph. In this graph,
denoted by G(n, r), there are n players which play with each other. This
interaction is given by the result of
(
n
2
)
independent coins flipping, each of
them with probability of success equal to r ∈ (0, 1) [6]. We are interested
in the behavior of cooperation as n tends to infinity, with r as a function
of n. Our results are also independent of a and b. We show, for example,
that the probability that cooperation survives in some part of the graph
tends to zero if r ≥ 1nc , 0 ≤ c < 1.
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Chapter 2
The optimal strategy of a
two-person zero-sum game
Consider a two-person game, played by player I and player II, which is
described by (SI , SII , AI , AII), where
1. SI = {r1, ..., rn} is the set of moves of player I;
2. SII = {c1, ..., cn} is the set of moves of player II;
3. AI and AII are the score functions defined on SI × SII ;
4. Xij = AI(ri, cj) = −AII(ri, cj), i, j = 1, 2..., n. The Xij ’s are iid
random variables with a standard normal distribution.
We interpret this as following [1]: the game is played on a n× n-matrix
X = [Xij ]1≤i,j≤n where the Xij ’s are iid random variables with a stan-
dard normal distribution. The matrix is known to both players; player I
chooses a row, i (ri), and player II chooses a column, j (cj); then player
II pays Xij to player I if Xij > 0. If Xij < 0, player I pays |Xij | to
player II. We allow both players to use mixed strategies.
Definition 1. A mixed strategy for player I is a vector probability p∗ =
[p∗1, ..., p∗n]
T , with
7
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1. p∗i ≥ 0, i = 1, ..., n;
2.
∑n
i=1p
∗
i = 1,
where p∗i is the probability that player I chooses the move ri. Moreover,
there are mixed strategies, called optimal strategies, with the following
properties [10]:
Theorem 2.0.1. For every finite two-person zero-sum game played on
a matrix X = [xij ]1≤i,j≤n,
1. there is a number V called the value of the game;
2. there is a mixed strategy p = [p1, ..., pn]T for player I, called an
optimal strategy, such that
n∑
i=1
pixij ≥ V for all j = 1, 2, ..., n;
3. there is a mixed strategy q for player II, called an optimal strategy,
such that
n∑
j=1
qjxij ≤ V for all i = 1, 2, ..., n.
This theorem, due to von Neumann, is the well-known Minimax Theo-
rem. In fact, the so-called Equilibrium theorem [10] says that if player
I plays p and player II plays q, then
n∑
i=1
pixij = V for all j = such that qj > 0,
and
n∑
j=1
qjxij = V for all i such that pi > 0.
9In this chapter, we study the optimal strategy of a game described
as above. More precisely, we establish the following result concern-
ing the maximal probability assigned to a row in the optimal strategy
p = [p1, ..., pn]T for player I given the realization of the payoff matrix.
Theorem 2.0.2. For any c > 10
√
pi
(
1 +
√
2 log 4
)√
log 4,
P
(
max
i∈[n]
pi >
c√
n
)
→ 0 as n→∞.
Proof. Consider any k×k sub-matrix Ak of X . Since the Xij ’s are stan-
dard normally distributed, the distribution of Ak−1 is invariant under
multiplication by any orthogonal matrix [1]. In particular, the distribu-
tion of Ak−1 is invariant under multiplication by a rotation matrix.
Let ξ1, ξ2, ..., ξk be i.i.d. standard normally distributed random variables.
Let also
xi =
ξi√∑k
j=1 ξ
2
j
.
It is well known that x = [x1, ..., xk]T is uniformly distributed on the
surface of the (unit) k-sphere.
Let now E+k = {yk = Ak−11 ∈ Rk+}, E−k = {yk = Ak−11 ∈ Rk−} and
Ek = E
+
k ∪ E−k , where yk = [y1, ..., yk]T .
Let also N+ = {x1 > 0, ..., xk > 0} and N− = {x1 < 0, ..., xk < 0}.
Since the xi’s are the coordinates of a uniformly distributed point on
the surface of the sphere, we have that for c, d > 0,
P
( |y1|
|y1|+ ...+ |yk| ≥
cd√
n
|Ek
)
= P
( |x1|
|x1|+ ...+ |xk| ≥
cd√
n
|N+
)
= P
( |ξ1|
|ξ1|+ ...+ |ξk| ≥
cd√
n
|N+
)
≤ P (|ξ1| ≥ c√n)
+P (d(|ξ2|+ ...+ |ξk|) ≤ n) .
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Since the ξi’s are N(0, 1) r.v., E(|ξ1|) =
√
2
pi , E(ξ1
2) = 1 and for x > 0
P (|ξ1| ≥ x) ≤ 2xe−
x2
2 [5]. In order to proceed, we need the following
Chernoff bound [7]:
Theorem 2.0.3. If X1, X2, ..., Xn are nonnegative independent random
variables, we have the following bound for the sum X =
∑n
i=1Xi:
P (X ≤ E(X)− λ) ≤ e−
λ2
2
∑n
i=1
E(Xi2) .
Letting Sk =
∑k
j=2 |ξj |, we then have
P
( |y1|
|y1|+ ...+ |yk| ≥
cd√
n
|Ek
)
≤ P (|ξ1| ≥ c√n)
+P
(
dSk ≤ E(dSk)−
(
d
√
2
pi
k − 1
n
− 1
)
n
)
≤ 2
c
√
n
e−
c2
2
n + e
− (d
√
2
pi
k−1
n −1)
2
2(k−1) n
2
.
Let now Z = |{i ∈ [n] : pi > 0}|. Finally, we have that
P
(
max
i∈[n]
pi ≥ cd√
n
)
= P
(
n⋃
i=1
{
pi ≥ cd√
n
})
=
n∑
k=1
P
(
n⋃
i=1
{
pi ≥ cd√
n
}
, Z = k
)
≤ P (Z ≤ b0.1nc)
+
n∑
k=b0.1nc+1
(
n
k
)2
P
(
k⋃
i=1
{
yi
y1 + ...+ yk
≥ cd√
n
}
|E+k
)
21−k
11
≤ P (Z ≤ b0.1nc)
+
n∑
k=b0.1nc+1
k
(
n
k
)2
21−k
 2
c
√
n
e−
c2
2
n + e
−
(
d
√
2
pi
k−1
n −1
)2
2(k−1) n
2

≤ P (Z ≤ b0.1nc)
+n2
 2
c
√
n
e−
c2
2
n + e−
(
d
√
2
pi (0.1− 1n)−1
)2
2
n
( max
k∈[b0.1nc+1;n]
(
n
k
)2
21−k
)
.
It is shown in [1] that P (Z ≤ b0.1nc)→ 0 as n→∞, and since
max
k∈[b0.1nc+1;n]
(
n
k
)2
21−k ≤ 4n,
we have that
P
(
max
i∈[n]
pi ≥ cd√
n
)
≤ P (Z ≤ b0.1nc)
+n24n
(
2
c
√
n
e−
c2
2
n + e−
(d
√
2
pi (0.1− 1n)−1)
2
2
n
)
→ 0,
as n→∞ if c > √2 log 4 and d > 10√
2
pi
(
1 +
√
2 log 4
)
.
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Chapter 3
The iterated Prisoner’s
dilemma on deterministic
graphs
In this chapter, we study the well-known prisoner’s dilemma in a spa-
tial setting. The prisoner’s dilemma is a two-person game described by
(SI , SII , AI , AII), where
1. SI = S = {C,D} is the set of possible moves of player I;
2. SII = S = {C,D} is the set of possible moves of player II;
3. AI and AII are the score functions defined on SI × SII , and
4. AI(i, j) = AII(j, i) = xij , i, j ∈ S, where xC,C = 1, xC,D = 0,
xD,C = b and xD,D = a, with 0 < a < 1, 1 < b < 2, a+ b ≤ 2.
Here C stands for "cooperate" and D for "defect". An alternative way
to write this is in terms of the payoff bi-matrix
( C D
C 1, 1 0, b
D b, 0 a, a
)
13
14 3. The iterated Prisoner’s dilemma on deterministic graphs
with 0 < a < 1, 1 < b < 2, a+ b ≤ 2.
Consider a graph G(V,E), where V and E are the vertex set and the edge
set respectively. Let vertices and edges represent players and interaction
respectively. More precisely, two vertices connected by an edge represent
two players playing against each other. We use i ↔ j to indicate that
player i and player j play against each other, i, j ∈ V (i.e. that there is
an edge between i and j). We define the neighbors of player i ∈ V as
those players whose vertices are connected by an edge to the vertex of
player i.
Let sit ∈ {C,D} be the move chosen by player i at time t = 0, 1, ...,
i ∈ V . Let also Ni = {i,N1i , ..., Nkii } be the neighborhood of player i,
where N1i , N
2
i , ..., N
ki
i are the ki neighbors of player i. Consider now a
game played with the following rules:
• at time zero, each player i ∈ V chooses, independently, move C
with probability p or move D with probability q = 1− p;
• at time t = 1, 2, ..., each player i ∈ V plays the prisoner’s dilemma
against its neighbors;
• at time one, player i chooses si0, and at time t = 2, 3, ..., it chooses
move according to the following updating rule:
st+1i =

C if @k ∈ Ni : vtk = maxj∈Ni vtj , stk = D
D if @k ∈ Ni : vtk = maxj∈Ni vtj , stk = C
sti otherwise,
where vti is the total score of player i at time t = 1, 2, ... More
formally, vti = v
t,C
i 1{sti=C} + v
t,D
i 1{sti=D}, where
vt,Ci =
∑
j:i↔j
1{stj=C}
and
vt,Di = b
∑
j:i↔j
1{stj=C} + a
∑
j:i↔j
1{stj=D}
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are the total score of player i at time t given that it chooses move
C and D respectively.
In short, the interpretation is as follows: at time t = 2, 3, ..., player
i ∈ V chooses the move of the player (within its neighborhood)
with highest score in the previous round. If there are two or more
players with highest score and different move, then player i chooses
the same move as the one chosen in the previous round.
In this chapter, we study the repeated prisoner’s dilemma played on some
deterministic graphs which have the common property that they contain
infinitely many players and where the number ki of neighbors is equal
for all i ∈ V . As we have seen above, cooperation is a weak strategy
against defection. The advantage of spatial structure is that it can make
it possible for cooperators to form clusters protecting themselves against
defectors [12][4]. This happens because the winnings of mutual coopera-
tion can overbalance losings against defection [12]. Here, we study only
cases when a D cannot be defeated so that the system is stable after a
finite number of rounds and the calculations become more simple.
We are mainly interested in the probability that cooperation survives as
the game is played repeatedly, in particular that a given player i ∈ V
survives as a cooperator as t → ∞. More formally, we study the limit
pip(C) = limt→∞ P (sit = C). To simplify, we refer to a player which
chooses move C as a C. In the same way, we refer to a player which
chooses move D as a D. We are also interested in the size of the cluster
in which player i ∈ V survives as C. We may regard such a cluster
as a community of cooperators. In this sense, we define a cluster as a
connected component of players such that all players choose same move.
Let Ci be the number of C’s in the cluster which contains player i, as
t→∞. In some cases, we find the distribution of Ci.
3.1 One dimensional lattice
Consider firstly the one dimensional lattice, where the players are the
elements of Z and where the game is played between each pair of players
whose Euclidean distance is one. This means that player i plays against
16 3. The iterated Prisoner’s dilemma on deterministic graphs
player i+ 1 and i− 1, i ∈ Z. This is a nice case since it is independent
of a and b, as we see in the following theorem:
Theorem 3.1.1. For all a and b such that 0 < a < 1, 1 < b < 2, a+ b ≤
2,
pip(C) =
(
q + p2
)2
p3 (3− 2p) .
Proof. When the game is played on the one dimensional lattice, each
player has only two neighbors. This means that the total score for player
i ∈ Z, at each time, is 2, 1 or 0 if it chooses move C; and it is 2b, b+ a
or 2a if it chooses move D. Since b > 1, a D cannot change to C.
Since a + b ≤ 2 and 2b > 2, a player which plays C at time t plays
C also at time t + 1 if and only if at time t: (i) it plays against two
C’s ; or (ii) it plays against a C and a D which play against another
C and another D respectively. In particular, this means that player i
has to belong, at each time, to a cluster of at least three C’s. Figure
3.1 shows initial configurations which give a final cluster of three C’s.
Consequently, P (Ci = 1) = P (Ci = 2) = 0, and for s = 3, 4, ..., we have
that
P (Ci = s) = spsq4 + 2sps+2q3 + sps+4q2 = spsq2(q + p2)2.
Then,
pip(C) =
∞∑
s=1
P (Ci = s)
=
∞∑
s=3
spsq2(q + p2)
2
= pq2(q + p2)
2
( ∞∑
s=1
d
dp
ps − 1− 2p
)
=
(
q + p2
)2
p3 (3− 2p) .
3.1. One dimensional lattice 17
The expectation of Ci is
E(Ci) =
∞∑
s=3
s2
(
psq4 + 2ps+2q3 + ps+4q2
)
=
∞∑
s=3
s(s+ 1)
(
psq4 + 2ps+2q3 + ps+4q2
)
−(q + p2)2p3 (3− 2p)
=
∞∑
s=1
s(s+ 1)
(
psq4 + 2ps+2q3 + ps+4q2
)
−2 (pq4 + 2p3q3 + p5q2)− 6 (p2q4 + 2p4q3 + p6q2)
−(q + p2)2p3 (3− 2p)
=
(
q4p+ 2q3p3 + q2p5
) d2
dp2
∞∑
s=1
ps+1
−2 (pq4 + 2p3q3 + p5q2)− 6 (p2q4 + 2p4q3 + p6q2)
−(q + p2)2p3 (3− 2p)
=
(
q4p+ 2q3p3 + q2p5
)( 2
q3
− 2− 6p
)
− (q + p2)2p3 (3− 2p)
=
p3(1− qp)2(9 + p(4p− 11))
q
.
Figure 3.1: Some configurations which produce a final cluster of three
C’s.
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3.2 Z× Z2
As a slightly more complex structure involving a second dimension in the
simplest possible form, consider now the lattice on Z× Z2, as we see in
Figure 3.2. Let each element (i, k) ∈ Z×Z2 be a player. For each pair of
players, let the players play against each other if their Euclidean distance
is one. We refer to the set of the players (i, k), i ∈ Z, as the players in
the kth row, k = 1, 2. This case, as in most cases, is not independent of
Figure 3.2: A part of the lattice on Z× Z2.
the parameters of the payoff matrix, as we see shall now see.
Theorem 3.2.1. If 3 ≥ 2a+ b > 2, a+ 2b > 3, then
pip(C) =
(
q2 + p4
)2
q4p2
(
1
(1− p2)2 − 1− 2p
2
)
.
Proof. Consider a player which chooses move C. Since 3 ≥ 2a + b and
a+2b > 3, at each time this player survives as C if and only if: (i) it plays
against three C’s; or (ii) at least one of its neighbors is a C which plays
against two other C’s and each D it plays against, plays only against
other D’s. Since 2a + b > 2, it is not possible for a D to change to C.
Suppose now that player i belongs, at time zero, to a cluster of s C’s,
s = 1, 2, .... Suppose also that there is at least one D which plays against
two or more C’s of this cluster. Because of the structure of this graph,
such a cluster cannot overbalance the losses against defection. Figure 3.3
shows an initial cluster of eight C’s which cannot survive. Consequently,
player i survives as C if and only if it belongs to an initial cluster of
s× 2 C’s, s = 3, 4, ... Figure 3.4 shows some initial configurations which
produce a final cluster of six C’s.
Now it is clear that P (Ci = 1) = ... = P (Ci = 5) = 0, and for s = 3, 4, ...,
P (Ci = 2s− 1) = 0 and P (Ci = 2s) = sp2sq8 + 2sp2(s+2)q6 + sp2(s+4)q4.
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Figure 3.3: An initial cluster of eight C’s which cannot resist the attack
of the defectors.
Figure 3.4: Some configurations which give a final cluster of six C’s.
Thus,
pip(C) =
∞∑
s=1
P (Ci = s)
=
∞∑
s=3
sp2sq8 + 2
∞∑
s=3
sp2(s+2)q6 +
∞∑
s=3
sp2(s+4)q4
=
(
q2 + p4
)2
q4
∞∑
s=3
sp2s
=
(
q2 + p4
)2
q4
(
p2
(1− p2)2 − p
2 − 2p4
)
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In this case, the expectation of Ci is
E(Ci) = 2
∞∑
s=3
s
(
sp2sq8 + 2sp2(s+2)q6 + sp2(s+4)q4
)
=
2qp6(9− 11p2 + 4p4)(1 + p(p+ p3 − 2))2
(1 + p)3
.
We now study a different case with the condition a + 2b ≤ 3 instead of
a+ 2b > 3. The new condition means that a cluster of four C’s in which
one C plays against the three other C’s remains intact if and only the
C’s do not play, at time one, against a D which plays against all C’s.
Theorem 3.2.2. If 2a+ b > 2 and a+ 2b ≤ 3, then
pip(C) =
(
q + p2(1− qp))2 (p4(4− 4p2))
+p6
(
q2 + 2pq2 + p2
) (
2p
(
q + p2(1− qp))− (q2 + 2pq2 + p2)) .
Proof. Since 2a+b > 2, a necessary condition for player i to survive as C
is that it belongs to a cluster of C’s in which every time there is at least
one C with total score equal to 3. Since a + 2b ≤ 3, a D invades that
cluster if and only if it plays against all C’s, and this can only happen
at time one. We recall that since 2a+ b > 2, a D cannot change to C.
Let Aj , j = 1, ..., 4, be the event that player i survives as C in a cluster
of the form shown in figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5: Player i belonging to different clusters of four C’s in which
one C has total score 3.
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From the above considerations, P (A1) = ... = P (A4) = p4
(
q + p2(1− qp))2.
We also have that P (A1 ∩ A2) = P (A1 ∩ A3) = p6
(
q + p2(1− qp))2,
P (A1 ∩ A4) = p6
(
q2 + 2pq2 + p2
)2, P (A2 ∩ A3) = p7(q + p2(1− qp))2,
P (A2 ∩ A4) = P (A3 ∩ A4) = p6
(
q + p2(1− qp))2, P (A1 ∩ A2 ∩ A3) =
P (A2 ∩A3 ∩A4) = p7
(
q + p2(1− qp))2, P (A1 ∩A2 ∩A4) = P (A1 ∩A3 ∩
A4) = p
7
(
q + p2(1− qp))(q2 + 2pq2 + p2) and
P (A1 ∩A2 ∩A3 ∩A4) = p7
(
q + p2(1− qp))2.
The inclusion-exclusion formula gives
pip(C) = P
(
4⋃
i=1
Ai
)
=
4∑
i=1
P (Ai)−
∑
i<j
P (Ai ∩Aj)
+
∑
i<j<k
P (Ai ∩Aj ∩Ak)− P (A1 ∩A2 ∩A3 ∩A4)
= 4p4
(
q + p2(1− qp))2 − 2p6(q + p2(1− qp))2
−p6(q2 + 2pq2 + p2)2 − p7(q + p2(1− qp))2
−2p6(q + p2(1− qp))2 + 2p7(q + p2(1− qp)))2
+2p7
(
q + p2(1− qp)) (q2 + 2pq2 + p2)− p7(q + p2(1− qp))2
=
(
q + p2(1− qp))2 (p4(4− 4p2))
+p6
(
q2 + 2pq2 + p2
) (
2p
(
q + p2(1− qp))− (q2 + 2pq2 + p2)) .
Remark. In this case (2a + b > 2, a + 2b ≤ 3), we do not compute the
expectation of Ci because it becomes much more complicated to obtain
P (Ci = s) when s is large.
In the previous cases, we had the condition 2a+b > 2, which means that
player i survives as C if and only if it belongs to a cluster in which every
time there is at least one C with total score 3. We now study a different
case, still on Z × Z2, with the new condition 2a + b = 2. This allows
player i to belong to a cluster in which there is at least one C with total
score 2 or 3.
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Theorem 3.2.3. If 2a+ b = 2 and a+ 2b > 3, then
pip(C) =
(
q2 + p4
)2
q4
(
p2
(1− p2)2 − p
2
)
+
q3p3(3− 2p+ 2p2)
(q + p2)2
(
q3 + pq
)2
.
Proof. Given these conditions, a C survives as C if and only if at each
time there is at least one C in its neighborhood with total score 2 or
3 and every time some player of this cluster plays against a D, that D
plays only against other D’s. Thus, there are two kind of clusters in
which player i can survive as C. One is when the C’s are positioned in
the same row. Given this graph, a C survives in a cluster of s C’s in a
row, s = 3, 4, ..., if and only if there are only D’s in the other row, and
in the ends of the rows there is no D which plays against two or more
C’s. Figure 3.6 shows initial configurations for which player i survives
as C in a cluster of 3 C’s in a row.
Then, the probability that player i survives as C in a cluster of s C’s in
a row, s = 3, 4, ..., is
spsqs+6 + 2sps+1qs+4(pq + pq2 + p2q(1− q2))
+sps+2qs+2(pq + pq2 + p2q(1− q2))2.
Another kind of cluster in which player i can survive as C consists of 2s
C’s, s = 2, 3, ..., with s of them in each row. Such a cluster remains intact
if and only if, at each time, the cluster plays against two C’s or two D’s
(which play against two other D’s) in each end. Thus, the probability
that player i survives as C in such a cluster of 2s C’s, s = 2, 3, ..., is
sp2sq8 + 2sp2(s+2)q6 + sp2(s+4)q4.
Then,
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Figure 3.6: Some initial configurations which give a final cluster of three
C’s.
pip(C) =
∞∑
s=2
sp2sq8 + 2
∞∑
s=2
sp2(s+2)q6 +
∞∑
s=2
sp2(s+4)q4
+
∞∑
s=3
spsqs+6 + 2
∞∑
s=3
sps+1qs+4(pq + pq2 + p2q(1− q2))
+
∞∑
s=3
sps+2qs+2(pq + pq2 + p2q(1− q2))2
=
∞∑
s=2
sp2sq4
(
q4 + 2p4q2 + p8
)
+
∞∑
s=3
spsqs
(
q6 + 2pq4 + p2q2
)
=
(
q2 + p4
)2
q4
(
p2
(1− p2)2 − p
2
)
+
q3p3(3− 2p+ 2p2)
(q + p2)2
(
q3 + pq
)2
.
We study the same case (2a+ b = 2, a+ 2b > 3) further in order to find
the distribution of Ci. From the considerations above, it is clear that
P (Ci = 1) = P (Ci = 2) = 0, and for s = 2, 3, ...,
24 3. The iterated Prisoner’s dilemma on deterministic graphs
P (Ci = 2s− 1) = (2s− 1)p2s−1q2s+5
+2(2s− 1)p2sq2s+3(pq + pq2 + p2q(1− q2))
+(2s− 1)p2s+1q2s+1(pq + pq2 + p2q(1− q2))2,
and
P (Ci = 2s) = sp2sq8 + 2sp2(s+2)q6 + sp2(s+4)q4
+2sp2sq2s+6 + 4sp2s+1q2s+4(pq + pq2 + p2q(1− q2))
+2sp2s+2q2s+2(pq + pq2 + p2q(1− q2))2.
The expectation of Ci is
E(Ci) =
∞∑
s=2
2sP (Ci = 2s)
+
∞∑
s=2
(2s− 1)P (Ci = 2s− 1)
=
2qp4
(
4− 3p2 + p4) (1 + p (−2 + p+ p3))2
(1 + p)3
+
1
(1− qp)3 q
7p3(9− qp(11− 4qp))×
× (−1 + p (1 + (−2 + p)p (1 + p2)))2 .
3.3 The binary tree
In this section, we study the iterated prisoner’s dilemma played on the
binary tree. Let each vertex represent a player, and let those players
whose vertices are connected by an edge play against each other. This
means that each player plays against three other players. Our first result
about the tree is the following theorem:
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Theorem 3.3.1. If 2a+ b > 2, a+ 2b ≤ 3 then
pip(C) = p4x6
(
4− 3p2x2(1 + px− p2x2))
where x = q(1− p2) + p.
Proof. Since 2a + b > 2 and a + 2b ≤ 3, player i survives as C if and
only if it belongs to a cluster of C’s in which at each time there is one
C with score equal to 3 and every time some player of this cluster plays
against a D, that D does not play against two other C’s. This means
such a cluster can be invaded only at time one.
Consider the four possible positions of player i in a cluster of four C’s,
in which one C plays against the other three C’s, as shown in figure 3.7.
Let Aj , j = 1, 2, 3, 4, be the event that player i survives as C in such a
cluster of four C’s with i at position j. Set x = q(1− p2) + p. Then, by
independence in the initial configuration, P (Aj) = p4x6, P (A1 ∩ A2) =
... = P (A1 ∩ A4) = p6x8, P (A2 ∩ A3) = ... = P (A3 ∩ A4) = p7x9,
P (A1∩A2∩A3) = ... = P (A1∩A3∩A4) = p8x10 and P (A2∩A3∩A4) =
P (A1 ∩A2 ∩A3 ∩A4) = p10x12. The inclusion-exclusion formula gives:
pip(C) = P
(
4⋃
i=1
Ai
)
= 4P (A1)− 3P (A1 ∩A2)− 3P (A2 ∩A3)
+3P (A1 ∩A2 ∩A3) + P (A2 ∩A3 ∩A4)
−P (A1 ∩A2 ∩A3 ∩A4)
= 4p4x6 − 3p6x8 − 3p7x9 + 3p8x10
= p4x6
(
4− 3p2x2(1 + px− p2x2)) .
The second part of this section is concerned with the case 2a + b >
2, a+ 2b > 3. Proposition 3.3.2 gives not an exact result, but it presents
an estimation of pip(C). Before we proceed, consider player i and its
neighbors and second neighbors i1, i2, i3, i11, i12, i21, i22, i31 and i32, as
shown in Figure 3.8. Let Bi be the event that player i and its three
neighbors are C’s at time zero. Obviously, P (Bi) = p4. Consider now
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Figure 3.7: Different positions in a cluster of four C’s in which there is
a C with total score equal to 3.
player ijk, j = 1, 2, 3, k = 1, 2. Let also Fjk be the event that vtijk ≤ 3
for all t = 1, 2, ..., supposing that player ij only plays against ijk. Set
now x = P (Fjk|Bi).
Proposition 3.3.2. If 3 > 2a+ b > 2, a+ 2b > 3, then
pip(C) = p4x6
(
4− 3p2x2 (1 + px− p2x2)) .
In addition, q2 ≤ x ≤ q3 + p.
Proof. Consider a player which chooses move C. At each time, in order
to survive as C, this player has to belong to a cluster of C’s in which at
least one C has total score three. Also, if a player of this cluster plays
against a D, that D plays only against other D’s. Since 2a+ b > 2, a D
cannot change to C. Consider also the four positions in such a cluster
of four C’s in which one C plays against the three other C’s, as shown
in Figure 3.7. Let again Aj , j = 1, 2, 3, 4, be the event that player i
survives as C with position j. Consider firstly the event A1. Then we
have that
P (A1) = P (Bi)P
 3⋂
j=1
2⋂
k=1
Fjk|Bi
.
Consider now each player ijk, j = 1, 2, 3, k = 1, 2. If player ijk chooses at
time zero move D, then the cluster is not invaded if and only if ijk’s two
other neighbors also choose at time zero move D. If player ijk instead
chooses at time zero move C, then the cluster is not invaded if (but not
only if) ijk’s two other neighbors choose at time zero move D. Thus,
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q2 ≤ x ≤ q3 + p. Since the ijk’s do not have neighbors in common
(excluding the ij ’s), it is then clear that
P
 3⋂
j=1
2⋂
k=1
Fjk|Bi
 = x6.
By independence in the initial configuration and using the same argu-
ments, it is easily seen that P (A1) = ... = P (A4) = p4x6, P (A1 ∩A2) =
... = P (A1 ∩ A4) = p6x8, P (A2 ∩ A3) = ... = P (A3 ∩ A4) = p7x9,
P (A1∩A2∩A3) = ... = P (A1∩A3∩A4) = p8x10 and P (A2∩A3∩A4) =
P (A1 ∩A2 ∩A3 ∩A4) = p10x12. The inclusion exclusion formula gives,
pip(C) = P
 4⋃
j=1
Aj

= 4p4x6 − 3p6x8 − 3p7x9 + 3p8x10
= p4x6
(
4− 3p2x2 (1 + px1 − p2x2)) .
Figure 3.8: The neighbors and second neighbors of player i.
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3.4 The (n− 1)-nary tree
As a generalization of much of the above, we now study the evolution of
cooperation when the iterated prisoner’s dilemma is played on the (n−1)-
nary tree, n = 2, 3, ... Note that the one-dimensional lattice, studied in
the beginning of this chapter, is the special case of the (n− 1)-nary tree
with n = 2. The following theorem generalizes Theorem 3.1.1 and
Theorem 3.3.1.
Theorem 3.4.1. If a+ (n− 1)b ≤ n, (n− 1)a+ b > n− 1 then
pip(C) = pn+1xn(n−1)
(
1− pn−1x2−3n+n2
)n
−pxn
((
1− pnx(n−2)n
)n − 1) ,
where x = p+ q(1− pn−1).
Proof. In the (n−1)-nary tree, each player plays against its n neighbors.
Since (n − 1)a + b > n − 1, player i, in order to survive as a C, has to
belong to a cluster in which, at each time, there is at least one C having
total score equal to n. Consider now the n+1 possible positions of player
i, in a cluster of (n + 1) C’s, in which one C plays against the other n
C’s (compare Figure 3.7). Since a + (n − 1)b ≤ n, a D invades that
cluster if and only if it plays against all C’s. Thus, such a cluster can
only be invaded at time one. Since (n − 1)a + b > n − 1, a D cannot
change to C. Let now Aj , j = 1, ..., n + 1, be the event that player i
survives as C in such a cluster of (n+ 1) C’s with i at position j. Here
position 1 refers to the position of the C playing against the other n C’s.
By independence at time zero, it is clear that P (A1) = ... = P (An+1) =
pn+1(p+ q(1− pn−1))(n−1)n. Set x = p+ q(1− pn−1). Then, we have
that P (A1 ∩ A2) = ... = P (A1 ∩ An+1) = p2nx2(n−1)2 and in general,
P (A1 ∩ A2 ∩ ... ∩ Am) = pn+1+(m−1)(n−1)x(m−1)(n−1)2+(n−1)(n−(m−1)),
m = 2, ..., n + 1. We also have that P (A2 ∩ A3) = p2n+1x2(n−1)2+n−2
and in general, P (A2 ∩ ... ∩ Am) = p(m−1)n+1x(m−1)(n−1)2+(n−(m−1)),
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m = 3, ..., n+ 1. The inclusion-exclusion formula gives in this case:
pip(C) = P
(
n+1⋃
i=1
Ai
)
= (n+ 1)P (A1)− nP (A1 ∩A2)−
(
n
2
)
P (A2 ∩A3)
+...+ (−1)n−1P (∩nj=1Aj)
= (n+ 1)P (A1) +
n∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
(−1)iP (A1 ∩ ... ∩Ai+1)
+
n∑
i=2
(
n
i
)
(−1)i−1P (A2 ∩ ... ∩Ai+1)
= (n+ 1)pn+1x(n−1)n
+
n∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
(−1)ipn+1+i(n−1)xi(n−1)2+(n−1)(n−i)
+
n∑
i=2
(
n
i
)
(−1)i−1pin+1xi(n−1)2+n−i
= (n+ 1)pn+1x(n−1)n
+pn+1xn(n−1)
n∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
(−1)ipi(n−1)xi(2−3n+n2)
−pxn
n∑
i=2
(
n
i
)
(−1)ipinxi(n−2)n.
Applying the Binomial theorem to the last expression, we finally get
pip(C) = (n+ 1)pn+1x(n−1)n
+pn+1xn(n−1)
((
1− pn−1x2−3n+n2
)n − 1)
−pxn
((
1− pnx(n−2)n
)n − 1− npnx(n−2)n)
= pn+1xn(n−1)
(
1− pn−1x2−3n+n2
)n
−pxn
((
1− pnx(n−2)n
)n − 1) .
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3.5 The d-dimensional lattice
So far we have studied the evolution of cooperation in relatively simple
networks. One natural step towards more complex graphs are the d-
dimensional lattices, d = 2, 3..., where the players are the elements of Zd
and those players which are adjacent play against each other. As we have
seen, spatial structure can make cooperation survive. This success occurs
when cooperators form clusters protecting themselves against defectors.
When the game is played on a lattice, it becomes of immediate interest
to know if there is positive probability that a given player survives in
an infinite cluster of cooperators. We interpret the existence of such a
cluster as if cooperation dominates the community.
Here, we analyze the case when (2d−1)a+b > 2d−1 and a+(2d−1)b ≤
2d. We study this case because of its simplicity: in this case, a C located
inside a large enough cluster of C’s cannot change to D. Firstly, we
establish that there is p ∈ (0, 1) such that the probability that player
i survives as C in an infinite cluster of C’s is greater than zero. This
is closely related to Percolation theory. In fact, we use very similar
arguments of the proof of Theorem 1.10 in [8] to show Theorem
3.5.1. Let θ(p) = P (Ci =∞) and pc = sup{p : θ(p) = 0}.
Theorem 3.5.1. If (2d− 1)a+ b > 2d− 1 and a+ (2d− 1)b ≤ 2d, then
0 < pc(d) < 1,
for d = 2, 3, ...
Proof. Firstly, we show that pc(d) > 0. Since (2d − 1)a + b > 2d − 1, a
D cannot change strategy. This means that, in order to have an infinite
cluster of C’s as t→∞, a necessary condition is that player i belongs to
an infinite cluster of C’s at time zero. Let σ(n) be the number of paths
which have length n and which start at the origin. It is clear that σ(n) is
at most 2d(2d− 1)n−1 [8]. Let also N(n) be the number of those paths
which contain only C’s. Then
θ(p) ≤ Pp(N(n) ≥ 1)
≤ Ep(N(n))
= pnσ(n)
≤ pn2d(2d− 1)n−1,
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for all n. This means that θ(p) = 0 if p < 12d−1 . Thus, pc(d) > 0.
Now, we show that pc(d) < 1. Consider firstly a symmetric 5×5× ...×5
d-dimensional box which contains in the center the origin. Let all players
contained in the box be cooperators. Consider now the player located
in the center of this box, i.e. player (0, ..., 0). Note that the minimal
number of edges needed to connect this player to a player located outside
the box is three. Since a+ (2d−1)b ≤ 2d, player (0, ..., 0) cannot change
strategy. This means that if at time zero there is an infinite connected
component of such boxes, then cooperation survives in an infinite cluster
independently of what happens to the other players. Let θˆ(p) be the
probability that there exists an infinite connected component of disjoint
symmetric 5×5×...×5 d-dimensional boxes such that all players are C’s,
and the origin is contained in the center of one of these boxes. Clearly,
θ(p) ≥ θˆ(p). Such a cluster is finite if and only if all paths to infinity
are blocked by a connected path of disjoint 5× 5× ...× 5 d-dimensional
boxes which (each of them) contain at least one D. Note that diagonals
are also used to connect boxes in such a path (since the boxes block the
paths from the origin to infinity). Call the box which contains the origin,
box 0. In the same way, call the box which contains player (5k, 0, ..., 0) in
the center, box k, k ∈ Z. If the there is such a component enclosing the
origin, then it must contain some box k, k = 1, 2, ... Note now that if box
k belongs to such a component, there is at least one self-avoiding path
starting from that box, passing through some box m, m = −1,−2, ...
and returning to box k. Then, such a path contains n boxes only if
k < n. Since each box is connected to one of the 3d − 1 closest located
boxes and since the path is a self-avoiding walk, there are no more than(
3d − 1)(3d − 2)n−1 such paths. Therefore,
1− θ(p) ≤ 1− θˆ(p)
≤
∞∑
n=1
(
1− p5d
)n
n
(
3d − 1
)(
3d − 2
)n−1
=
(
3d − 1
)(
1− p5d
) ∞∑
n=1
n
((
1− p5d
)(
3d − 2
))n−1
=
(
3d − 1) (1− p5d)(
1− (3d − 2) (1− p5d))2 if
(
1− p5d
)
<
1
(3d − 2) .
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This means that 1 − θ(p) → 0 as 1 − p5d → 0. Thus, we can find
0 < p0 < 1 such that 1− θ(p) ≤ 12 if p > p0 and then pc ≤ p0.
As explained above, if (2d − 1)a + b > 2d − 1 and a + (2d − 1)b ≤ 2d,
then a player located in the center of a 5× 5× ...× 5 d-dimensional box
of cooperators survives as C independently of what happens to the other
players, so obviously, pip(C) ≥ p5d . In order to give a better bound, we
study the same case further. We only do this for d = 2 because the
calculations become much more complicated for larger d.
Proposition 3.5.2. If 3a+ b > 3 and a+ 3b ≤ 4, then
y < pip(C) < 5y,
where
y = p(2 + p(−4 + p(−4 + p(10 + p(7 + p(−14 + p×
×(−10 + p(20 + p(−46 + p(172 + p(−203 + p(−154 + p×
×(617 + p(−746 + p(777 + p(−926 + p(863 + p(−506 + p×
×(147 + p(70 + p(−135 + p(86− 23p+ p3)))))))))))))))))))))).
Proof. Since 3a + b > 3, player i ∈ Z2 survives as C only if, at each
time, it belongs to a cluster of five C’s in which there is at least one
C with total score equal to 4. Since a + 3b ≤ 4, this cluster remains
intact if and only if it never plays against a D which plays against all
C’s. This means that a D can invade such a cluster of five C’s only
at time one. Now, consider the five positions of such cluster and let
Aj be the event that player i survives as C, with position j = 1, 2, ..., 5,
where position one refers to the C which plays against the four other C’s.
Note that since 3a+ b > 3, a D cannot be defeated by a C. Obviously,
P (A1) = ... = P (A5). We show in the Appendix that P (Ai) = y, y as
given above. Since P (Ai) < pip(C) < 5P (Ai), the proof is complete.
3.6 Z× Cn
In this section, we study the iterated prisoner’s when the presence of
defectors at time zero is rare. More precisely, we study the asymptotic
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distribution of cooperation as p tends to one. Firstly, consider the lat-
tice on Z× Zn, n = 2, 3, ... Let each element (i, j) ∈ Z× Zn be a player.
For each pair of players, let the players play against each other if their
Euclidean distance is one. We refer to the set of the players (i, j), i ∈ Z,
as the players in the jth row, j = 1, 2, ..., n. In the same way, we refer to
the set of players (i, j), j = 1, 2, ..., n, as the players in the ith column. In
order to have symmetric conditions for all players, let each player located
in the nth row play against the player located in the same column and
1st row. This means that player (i, n) plays against player (i, 1), i ∈ Z.
We call a graph constructed in this way Cn. Note that the lattice on
Z× Z2 is the particular case of this graph with n = 2.
We choose to study this graph instead of the square lattice because this
one facilitates the calculations when p tends to one. In particular, we
analyze three different cases with the common property that a D cannot
change to C. With this property, it is easier to capture the evolution of
defection when one single defector appears inside a cluster of cooperators.
In other cases, when a D can change to C, we cannot establish rigorous
results concerning limp→1 pip(C).
Let A be the event that player i starts as C in the center of a cluster
of 5 × n C’s. Obviously, P (A) → 1 as p → 1. Since P (sti = C) =
P (sti = C|A)P (A) + P (sti = C|Ac)P (Ac), we have that limp→1 pip(C) =
limp→1 P (sti = C|A). Now, we can show the following results:
Proposition 3.6.1. If a+ 3b ≤ 4, then
lim
p→1
pip(C) = 1.
Proof. Consider a cluster of 5 × n C’s. Since a + 3b ≤ 4, a D invades
this cluster if and only if it plays against all C’s. Thus, it is clear that
P (sti = C|A) = 1 for t = 1, 2, ...
Theorem 3.6.2. If a+ 3b > 4 and 3a+ b > 3, then
lim
p→1
pip(C) =

0 if n = 3, 4, 5
15/36 if n = 6
20/49 if n = 7
1− 6n + 9n2 if n = 8, 9, ...
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Proof. We show the case when n ≥ 8. The other cases are shown in a
similar way. Let the column of player i be column 0, and enumerate the
columns to the right as 1,2,..., and to the left, as -1,-2,... Let the row
of player i be row 0 and enumerate the rows upwards as 1, 2, ..., bn−12 c,
and downwards as −1,−2, ...,−dn−12 e. Let ξ1 and ξ2 be the first column
to the right and to the left respectively which contains, at time zero,
one or more D’s. Let also Xk be the the number of D’s in column
k at time zero, k ∈ Z. Obviously, P (ξ1 < ∞) = P (ξ2 < ∞) = 1
for all p ∈ (0, 1). We also have that P (Xk = 1|ξ1 = k) = P (Xm =
1|ξ2 = m) = n(1−p)p
n−1
1−pn → 1 as p → 1, k = 1, 2, ..., m = −1,−2, ...
This means that the probability that there are more than one D in the
same column tends to zero as p tends to one. In fact, for any n < ∞,
P (Xk+1 = 0, Xk+2 = 0, ..., Xk+n = 0|ξ1 = k)→ 1 as p→ 1.
Since a+3b > 4 and 3a+b > 3, if there is a singleD inside a cluster of C’s,
then that D starts a cluster of D’s which invade the C’s. That cluster
forms a cross whose arms have width equal to three rows/columns, as
we can see in figure 3.9. Since other D’s starting far away will not have
effect on player i, we can assume that there is, at time zero and as p
tends to one, only one D on each side of player i.
Such a cluster of D’s grows if and only if at least one of the D’s located
in one of the ends plays against three C’s. This means that player i
survives as C if:
• at time zero, there is no D in row −2,−1, 0, 1, 2. This happens, as
p→ 1, with probability (n−5n )2;
• there is a D which starts a cluster of D’s in row 2 (-2) on one
side, and there is no D starting in row -3,-2,-1,0,1 (3,2,1,0,-1) on
the other side. This event has probability, as p → 1, equal to
4n−6
n2
+ 2
n2
;
• there is a D starting a cluster of D’s in row 1 (-1) on one side,
and this cluster is stopped by another cluster of D’s started in
row 2 or 3 (-2 or -3) on the other side. The probability for this is
8 1
n2
limp→1 P (ξ1 ≥ ξ2). The cluster of D’s is stopped by another
cluster of D’s started in the same row, without defection of player
i, only if ξ1 = ξ2. The probability for the last event, as p → 1, is
3.6. Z× Cn 35
Figure 3.9: Evolution of a cluster of D’s started by a single D, with
n = 17 and the conditions a+ 3b > 4 and 3a+ b > 3.
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2 1
n2
limp→1 P (ξ1 = ξ2);
• there is a D starting a cluster of D’s in row 0 on one side, and this
cluster is stopped by another cluster of D’s started by a D in row
2 or -2 on the other side. This has probability 4 1
n2
limp→1 P (ξ1 ≥
ξ2 + 2).
The random variables ξ1 and ξ2 are independent and geometrically dis-
tributed with parameter 1−pn. This means that P (ξ1 = ξ2) = (1−p
n)
1+pn →
0 as p→ 1. We also have that P (ξ1 ≥ ξ2+k) =
∑∞
t=1
∑∞
s=t+k p
n(s−1)(1−
pn)pn(t−1)(1− pn) = pnk1+pn → 12 as p→ 1, k = 1, 2, ... Thus,
lim
p→1
pip(C) =
(
n− 5
n
)2
+ 4
n− 6
n2
+
2
n2
+8
1
n2
1
2
+ 2
1
n2
1
2
+ 4
1
n2
1
2
= 1− 6
n
+
9
n2
.
Theorem 3.6.3. If a+ 3b > 4 and 3a+ b = 3, then
lim
p→1
pip(C) =

0 if n = 3, 4
10/25 if n = 5
15/36 if n = 6
1− 6n + 13n2 if n = 7, 8, ...
Proof. We show the case when n ≥ 7. Given these conditions, a single
D starting inside a cluster of C’s will invade the C’s forming a cross.
As in the previous case, the arms of the cross will also have width equal
to three rows/columns. Since 3a + b = 3, a C can survive as C in a
cluster of C’s which has width two rows/columns (in the previous case
the cluster of C’s needs to have, at least, width three rows/columns), as
shown in Figure 3.10.
The arms of such a cluster of D’s grow only if the D’s located in the
ends play against three C’s. Thus, player i survives as C, as t → ∞, if
at time zero:
3.6. Z× Cn 37
Figure 3.10: A cluster of C’s with width two (rows) surrounded by D’s.
• there is no D starting a cluster of D’s in row −2,−1, 0, 1, 2;
• there is a D which starts a cluster of D’s in row 2 (-2) on one side,
and there is no D starting in row -2,-1,0,1 (2,1,0,-1) on the other
side. This has probability, as p→ 1, equal to 4n−5
n2
+ 2
n2
;
• there is a D starting in row 1 (-1) on one side. The cluster of D’s
is stopped by another cluster of D’s started in row 2 or 3 (-2 or -3)
on the other side. This happens, as p→ 1, with probability 4
n2
;
• there is a D which starts a cluster of D’s in row 0 on one side, and
this cluster is stopped by another cluster of D’s started in row 2
or -2 on the other side. The probability of this event is, as p→ 1,
equal to 2
n2
.
We can conclude that
lim
p→1
pip(C) =
(
n− 5
n
)2
+ 4
n− 5
n2
+
8
n2
.
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Chapter 4
The iterated Prisoner’s
dilemma on random graphs
In this chapter, once again we study the iterated Prisoner’s dilemma in
a spatial setting. As described previously, each player associated with
a vertex in a given graph plays the game against its neighbors. Now,
the game is played in a more typical network than those regular graphs
analyzed in the previous chapter. More precisely, it is played on a graph
constructed, at time zero, by random mechanisms.
4.1 Binomial random graph
Let Ω be the set of all graphs on vertex set V = {1, 2, ..., n}, and for
each graph ω ∈ Ω, set
P (ω) = reω(1− r)(n2)−eω ,
where eω is the number of edges of ω and r is the probability that two
vertex are connected. The graph chosen according to the P (ω)’s, intro-
duced by Erdös and Rényi in 1961, is called the binomial random graph
and denoted G(n, r) [6]. Let nodes and edges represent players and in-
teraction respectively in the usual way.
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Let Y iC ∈ Bi(n− 1, pr) (Y iD ∈ Bi(n− 1, qr)) be the number of C’s (D’s)
which play against player i ∈ V at time 1. Let also Y i = Y iC + Y iD and,
as in Chapter 3, let vti = v
t,C
i 1{sti=C} + v
t,D
i 1{sti=D} be the total score
for player i at time t, where vt,si is the total score of player i at time t
given it uses strategy s ∈ S = {C,D}. That is,
vt,Ci =
∑
j:i↔j
1{stj=C},
and
vt,Di = b
∑
j:i↔j
1{stj=C} + a
∑
j:i↔j
1{stj=D},
where the notation i ↔ j indicates that there is an edge between i and
j. Clearly, E(v1,Ci ) = (n− 1)pr and E(v1,Di ) = (bp+ aq)(n− 1)r.
Here, the rules of the game are as described in Chapter 3, with the only
difference that the players compare their average score. More formally,
for t = 1, 2, ...,
st+1i =

C if Y i > 0, @k ∈ Ni : v
t
k
Y k
= maxj∈Ni
vtj
Y j
, stk = D
D if Y i > 0, @k ∈ Ni : v
t
k
Y k
= maxj∈Ni
vtj
Y j
, stk = C
sti otherwise,
where Ni is the neighborhood of player i (including i itself).
In this chapter, we study the asymptotic distribution of cooperation as
n→∞ and show some rigorous results concerning the survival of coop-
eration with r = r(n) as a function of n. These results are independent
of a and b.
Firstly, we note that since b > 1, then pip(C) = pn → 0 as n → ∞ if
r = 1. This may suggest that too much interaction rules out coopera-
tion. Indeed, this turns out to be (at least partially) true, as we see in
the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1.1. If r ≥ 1nc , 0 ≤ c < 1, then for t = 2, 3, ...,
lim
n→∞P (∪
n
i=1
{
sit = C
}
) = 0.
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Proof. It is clear that for t = 2, 3, ...,
P (∪ni=1
{
sit = C
}
) ≤ o(1)
+nP
(
Y 1C > 0, Y
1
D > 0,
{
∃j : 1↔ j, v
1,C
1
Y 1
≥ v
1,D
j
Y j
})
≤ o(1)
+n2P
(
v1,C1 Y
2 ≥ v1,D2 Y 1, Y 2 ≥ b1/2(n− 1)r, Y 1 ≤
1
b1/2
(n− 1)r
)
+n2P
(
v1,C1 Y
2 ≥ v1,D2 Y 1, Y 2 ≤ b1/2(n− 1)r, Y 1 ≤
1
b1/2
(n− 1)r
)
+n2P
(
v1,C1 Y
2 ≥ v1,D2 Y 1, Y 2 ≥ b1/2(n− 1)r, Y 1 ≥
1
b1/2
(n− 1)r
)
+n2P
(
v1,C1 Y
2 ≥ v1,D2 Y 1, Y 2 ≤ b1/2(n− 1)r, Y 1 ≥
1
b1/2
(n− 1)r
)
≤ o(1) + 2n2P
(
Y 2 ≥ b1/2(n− 1)r
)
+n2P
(
Y 1 ≤ 1
b1/2
(n− 1)r
)
+ n2P
(
v1,C1 b
1/2 ≥ v1,D2
1
b1/2
)
= o(1) + 2n2P
(
Y 2 ≥ E (Y 2)+ (b1/2 − 1)(n− 1)r)
+n2P
(
Y 1 ≤ E (Y 1)− (1− 1
b1/2
)
(n− 1)r
)
+n2P
(
v1,C1 ≥ v1,D2
1
b
, v1,D2 ≤ b(n− 1)pr +
a
2
(n− 1)qr
)
+n2P
(
v1,C1 ≥ v1,D2
1
b
, v1,D2 > b(n− 1)pr +
a
2
(n− 1)qr
)
≤ o(1) + 2n2P
(
Y 2 ≥ E (Y 2)+ (b1/2 − 1)(n− 1)r)
+n2P
(
Y 1 ≤ E (Y 1)− (1− 1
b1/2
)
(n− 1)r
)
+n2P
(
v1,D2 ≤ E
(
v1,D2
)
− a
2
(n− 1)qr
)
+n2P
(
v1,C1 ≥ E
(
v1,C2
)
+
a
2b
(n− 1)qr
)
.
The proof is now completed by the following Chernoff bounds [7]:
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Theorem 4.1.2. Let X1, X2, ..., Xn be independent random variables
with P (Xi = 1) = pi, P (Xi = 0) = 1 − pi. We consider the sum
X =
∑n
i=1Xi, with expectation E(X) =
∑n
i=1 pi. Then we have
P (X ≥ E(X) + u) ≤ e−
u2
2(E(X)+u3 ) .
Theorem 4.1.3. If X1, X2, ..., Xn are non-negative independent random
variables, we have the following bounds for the sum X =
∑n
i=1Xi:
P (X ≤ E(X)− u) ≤ e−
u2
2
∑n
i=1
E(X2
i
) .
Thus,
P (∪ni=1sit = C) = o(1) + 2n2e
− ((b
1/2−1)(n−1)r)
2
2
(
(n−1)r+ b1/2−13 (n−1)r
)
+n2e
−
((
1− 1
b1/2
)
(n−1)r
)2
2((n−1)r) + n2e
− (
a
2 (n−1)qr)
2
2(b2(n−1)pr+a2(n−1)qr)
+n2e
− (
a
2b
(n−1)qr)
2
2((n−1)pr+ a6b (n−1)qr)
→ 0,
as n→∞.
As we see in the previous result, too much interaction kills cooperation.
But is it possible at all for cooperation to survive when r > 0? An
immediate answer comes by noting that limn→∞ (1− r)n−1 = 1 if 0 <
r < 1nc , c > 1, so limn→∞ pip(C) = p. So, yes a given player can be an
isolated cooperator when r is small enough. Indeed, it is easily seen that
if r = c/n, c > 0, then for t = 1, 2, ...,
lim
n→∞P (s
i
t = C, Y
i = 0) = pe−c.
Moreover, it is well known that there are asymptotically almost surely
(a.a.s.) isolated players when r = logncn , c > 1, a special case of the
following theorem (Erdös and Rényi [6]):
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Theorem 4.1.4. Let Tv be the number of v−vertex isolated trees in
G(n, r), v = 1, 2, ..., and cn = vnr − log n− (v − 1) log log n. Then,
P (Tv > 0)→
{
0 if nvrv−1 → 0 or cn →∞,
1 if nvrv−1 →∞ and cn → −∞.
Moreover, if nvrv−1 → c ∈ (0,∞) or cn → c > 0, then Tv d→ Po(λ),
where λ = limn→∞ E(Tv) ∈ (0,∞).
According to Theorem 4.1.4 there is positive probability that, as n
tends to infinity, there are isolated cooperators if r = logncn , c > 1. Of
course, this is not of so much interest since we are mainly interested
in the probability that cooperation survives as a result of interaction
between the players. But it may still suggest that limited interaction
leaves room for cooperation to survive. In order to ensure interaction,
we investigate this further by studying the game played on the largest
component with r big enough so that this component is a.a.s. unique.
Such a component may be regarded as the biggest community of players.
Firstly, we study the case when r = cn , c > 1, as we see in the theorem
bellow. Note that in this case the limit is the Poisson distribution. Let
Bi be the event that player i survives as C, as t → ∞, in a component
which has at least one more player than any other component.
Theorem 4.1.5. If r = cn and c > 1, then
lim
n→∞P (Bi) > 0.
Proof. Firstly, we recall that when the game is played on the one dimen-
sional lattice there are some local configurations which protect cooper-
ation as t tends to infinity. Consider now player i ∈ V , and suppose
that this player plays only against one player, say i1. Let player i1 play
only against one more player, i2. Let also player i2 play only against one
more player, i3, and so on until we reach a connected component of seven
players. Let now the seventh player, which we call i6, be connected to
the largest component through other players. Then, the interaction for
these players is only described by i↔ i1, i1↔ i2, i2↔ i3, i3↔ i4, i4↔
i5, i5 ↔ i6, i6 ↔ ·, where i6 ↔ · denotes that player i6 is connected to
the largest component. We find such a structure in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: A subgraph of the largest component which can ensure co-
operation for player i as t→∞.
If player i, i1 and i2 choose at time 0 strategy C, then they survive as C’s
if and only if at time 0: i) player i3 and i4 choose strategy D; ii) player
i3 and i4 choose strategy C; or iii) player i3 and i4 choose strategy C
and D respectively. Given one of these configurations, players i, i1 and
i2 survive as C’s independently of what happens to the other players.
Consequently, we only need to show that such a local tree of seven play-
ers, connected to the largest component, occurs with positive probability.
The following theorem gives the size of the largest component [6]:
Theorem 4.1.6. If r = cn and c > 1, then G(n, r) contains a giant
component of (1 + or(1))βn, where β is the unique solution of
β + e−βc = 1.
Furthermore, asymptotically almost surely (a.a.s.) the size of the second
largest component of G(n, r) is at most 16c
(c−1)2 log n.
Now let Lj be the event that player j ∈ V belongs to a component which
has at least one more player than any other component. It is then clear
that given the local tree of seven players shown in Figure 4.1,
lim
n→∞P (Li6) = β.
Since for any k < ∞, Bin(n − k, cn) → Poi(c) as n → ∞, then the
probability that a given player belongs to such a structure as player i in
Figure 4.1 (for any i1, ..., i6 ∈ V ), tends to c6e−6cβ as n → ∞. In the
same way, the probability that a given player belongs to such a subgraph
as player ij , j = 1, 2, tends to c
6e−6cβ
2 as n → ∞. By independence in
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the initial configuration, it is then clear that
lim
n→∞P (Bi) ≥ β2p
3(1− pq)c6e−6c.
As described above, when the limit is the Poisson distribution a given
vertex has positive probability to belong to such a subgraph as the lo-
cal tree shown in Figure 4.1. If we have instead r = r(n) such that
limn→∞ 1nr = 0, then that probability tends to zero as n tends to infin-
ity. With this in mind, it is now of interest to know if cooperation can
still survive in the largest component when r is of bigger order than cn . As
we saw in Theorem 4.1.1, cooperation dies out a.a.s. if r = 1nc , c < 1.
Now we study the intermediate case when r = λ lognn , with λ = λ(n) as
a function of n. The theorem below, weaker than Theorem 4.1.5, says
that cooperation survives a.a.s. in some part of the biggest community
of players if we choose λ = λ(n) in a proper way. More precisely,
Theorem 4.1.7. If r = λ log(n)n and λ ≤ 16 such that λlog n → ∞ as
n→∞, then
lim
n→∞P
(
n⋃
i=1
Bi
)
= 1.
Proof. In this case, the probability that a given player j ∈ V is connected
to a component which has at least one more player than any other com-
ponent tends to one as n tends to infinity. So if we consider again the
subgraph shown in Figure 4.1, then P (Li6) = 1 − o(1). Consider again
the local tree described in the proof of Theorem 4.1.5 and let Rj be
the event that player j ∈ V belongs to such a structure as player i in
Figure 4.1 (for any i1, ..., i6 ∈ V ). Then, we have that
P (Rj) =
(
6∏
k=1
(n− k)
)
r6(1− r)
∑7
k=2(n−k)(1− o(1))
∼ n6λ6 (log n)
6
n6
(1− r)6n
∼ λ6(log n)6e−6λ logn
= λ6(log n)6n−6λ,
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where an ∼ bn denotes 0 < lim inf anbn ≤ lim sup anbn < ∞. Let now
X =
∑n
j=1 1Rj . If λ ≤ 16 such that λlog n→∞ as n→∞, then
E(X) = nP (R1)
→ ∞
as n→∞. We also have that
Var(X) =
n∑
j=1
Var(1Ri) +
n∑
i=j
∑
i 6=j
Cov(1Rj ,1Ri)
= nP (R1)(1− P (R1))
+n(n− 1)(E(1R1∩R2)− E(1R1)2).
Now, for large enough n
E (1R1∩R2) ≤
(
13∏
k=2
(n− k)
)
r12(1− r)
∑14
k=3(n−k)
≤
(
6∏
k=1
(n− k)2
)
r12
(1− r)2
∑7
k=2(n−k)
(1− r)48
=
E(1R1)
2
(1− o(1))2(1− r)48
= E(1R1)
2(1 + o(1)).
Consequently,
Var(X) ≤ E(X)((1− P (R1)) + E(X)o(1)).
Before we complete the proof, we present the second moment method
which says that for every random variable Y with E(Y ) > 0, then
P (Y = 0) ≤ Var(Y )
E(Y )2
.
Therefore, if λ ≤ 16 such that λlog n→∞ as n→∞, then
P (X = 0) ≤ Var(X)
E(X)2
→ 0,
as n→∞.
Remark. The ideas in the proof of Theorem 4.1.7 were taken from the
proof of the well known connectivity theorem of Erdös and Rényi [11].
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.5.2
Proof. In order to complete the proof of Theorem 3.5.2, we need to
calculate P (A1). Consider firstly the eight nearest neighbors of a cluster
of five C’s where one C plays against the other four C’s. Call these
players 1, 2, ..., 8, as shown in figure 4.2. Note the difference between
players 1, 3, 5, 7 and 2, 4, 6, 8. Here, a player denoted by an even number
plays against two C’s of this cluster, while a player given an odd number
plays only against one C of the cluster. Since defection of such a cluster
Figure 4.2: The eight neighbors of a group of 5 C’s.
can only happen at time one, then P (A1) is the probability that, at time
zero, player i and its four neighbors are C’s and no one of these eight
neighbors is a D surrounded by four C’s. Let now S = (s10, s20, ..., s80) be
the initial configuration of the neighbors of that cluster. Therefore, we
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have that
P (Ai) = P (Ai ∩ {S = (C, ..., C)})
+
4∑
k=1
(
4
k
)
P
Ai k⋂
i=1
{s2i−10 = D}
4⋂
i=k+1
{s2i−10 = C}
4⋂
j=1
{s2i0 = C}

+
4∑
k=1
(
4
k
)
P
Ai k⋂
i=1
{s2i0 = D}
4⋂
i=k+1
{s2i0 = C}
4⋂
j=1
{s2i−10 = C}

+8P (Ai ∩ {S = (D,D,C,C,C,C,C,C)})
+8P (Ai ∩ {S = (D,C,C,D,C,C,C,C)})
+4P (Ai ∩ {S = (D,D,C,C,C,C,C,D)})
+16P (Ai ∩ {S = (D,D,C,D,C,C,C,C)})
+4P (Ai ∩ {S = (D,C,C,D,C,D,C,C)})
+4P (Ai ∩ {S = (D,D,D,C,C,C,C,C)})
+16P (Ai ∩ {S = (D,D,C,C,C,C,D,C)})
+4P (Ai ∩ {S = (D,C,D,C,C,D,C,C)})
+8P (Ai ∩ {S = (D,D,C,C,C,C,D,D)})
+8P (Ai ∩ {S = (D,D,C,C,C,D,D,C)})
+4P (Ai ∩ {S = (D,D,C,C,D,C,C,D)})
+4P (Ai ∩ {S = (D,D,D,C,C,D,C,C)})
+8P (Ai ∩ {S = (D,C,D,D,C,D,C,C)})
+8P (Ai ∩ {S = (D,D,C,D,C,C,C,D)})
+8P (Ai ∩ {S = (D,C,D,D,C,C,D,C)})
+4P (Ai ∩ {S = (D,D,C,D,C,D,C,D)})
+8P (Ai ∩ {S = (D,D,D,C,C,D,C,D)})
+4P (Ai ∩ {S = (D,D,D,D,C,C,C,D)})
+8P (Ai ∩ {S = (D,D,C,D,D,C,C,D)})
+4P (Ai ∩ {S = (D,C,D,D,C,D,C,D)})
+4P (Ai ∩ {S = (D,D,D,C,C,C,D,D)})
+8P (Ai ∩ {S = (D,C,D,C,C,D,D,D)})
+4P (Ai ∩ {S = (D,C,D,D,C,D,D,C)})
+8P (Ai ∩ {S = (D,D,D,C,C,D,D,C)})
+4P (Ai ∩ {S = (D,D,D,C,D,C,D,C)})
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+4P (Ai ∩ {S = (D,D,D,D,C,D,C,D)})
+2P (Ai ∩ {S = (D,D,C,D,D,D,C,D)})
+8P (Ai ∩ {S = (C,D,D,D,D,D,D,C)})
+8P (Ai ∩ {S = (D,D,D,D,C,D,D,C)})
+4P (Ai ∩ {S = (D,D,D,D,D,C,D,C)})
+2P (Ai ∩ {S = (D,D,D,C,D,D,D,C)})
+4P (Ai ∩ {S = (D,D,D,D,D,D,C,D)})
+4P (Ai ∩ {S = (D,D,D,D,D,D,D,C)})
+P (Ai ∩ {S = (D,D,D,D,D,D,D,D)})
Independence in the initial configuration gives:
P (Ai) = p
5
(
p8 +
4∑
k=1
(
4
k
)
p8−kqk(1− p3)k
)
+p5
4∑
k=1
(
4
k
)
p8−kqk(1− p2)k + 8p11q2 (q + pq(1− p2))
+8p11q2
(
(1− p3)(1− p2))+ 4p10q3 (q2 + 2pq2 + p2q3)
+16p10q3
(
q + pq(1− p2)) (1− p2) + 4p10q3(1− p3)(1− p2)2
+4p10q3
(
q2 + 2pq(1− p2))+ 16p10q3 (q + pq(1− p2)) (1− p3)
+4p10q3(1− p2)(1− p3)2 + 8p9q4 (q2 + 2pq2(1− p2) + p2q2(1− p2))
+8p9q4
(
q + pq(1− p2))2 + 4p9q4 (q2 + 2pq2 + p2q3) (1− p3)
+4p9q4
(
q2 + 2pq(1− p2)) (1− p2)
+8p9q4(1− p3) (q + pq(1− p2)) (1− p2)
+8p9q4
(
q2 + 2pq2 + p2q3
)
(1− p2) + 8p9q4 (q + pq(1− p2)) (1− p3)2
+4p8q5(1− p2)2 (q2 + 2pq2 + p2q3)
+8p8q5
(
q2 + 2pq2(1− p2) + p2q2(1− p2)) (1− p2)
+4p8q5
(
q2(1− p2)2 + 2pq(1− p2)(q + pq2)
)
(1− p2)
+8p8q5
(
q + pq(1− p2)) (q2 + 2pq2 + p2q3)
+4p8q5
(
q + pq(1− p2))2(1− p2)
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+ 4p8q5
(
q2(1− p3)2 + 2pq2(1− p3) + p2q3
)
+ 8p8q5(1− p3) (q2(1− p2) + 2pq2(1− p3) + p2q3)
+4p8q5(1− p3)(q + pq(1− p2))2
+ 8p8q5
(
q + pq(1− p2)) (q2 + 2pq(1− p2))
+ 4p8q5
(
q2 + 2pq(1− p2)) (1− p3)2
+ 4p7q6
(
q2(1− p2)3 + 2pq(1− p2)2(q + pq2)
)
+ 2p7q6
(
q2 + 2pq2 + p2q3
)2
+ 8p7q6
(
q2(1− p3)(q + (2− p)p(1− p2)) + pq2 + (pq)2(1− p2)(1 + q)
)
+ 8p7q6
(
q + pq(1− p2)) (q2(1− p2) + 2pq2 + p2q3)
+ 4p7q6
(
q + pq(1− p2)) (q2(1− p2) + pq(1− p2)2 + pq(q + pq2))
+ 2p7q6
(
q2 + 2pq(1− p2))2
+ 4p6q7
(
q2(q + pq(1− p2))2 + 2pq2(q + pq(1− p2))(1− p2)
+p2q3(1− p2)2)
+ 4p6q7
(
q2(q + pq(1− p2))2
+2pq2(q + pq(1− p2))(q2 + pq2 + pq(1− p2)))
+ p5q8
(
q4(1− p3)2 + 4pq4(1− p3)
+4p2q4 + 2p2q4(1− p3) + 4p3q4 + p4q4)
= p(2 + p(−4 + p(−4 + p(10 + p(7 + p(−14 + p×
×(−10 + p(20 + p(−46 + p(172 + p(−203 + p(−154 + p×
×(617 + p(−746 + p(777 + p(−926 + p(863 + p(−506 + p×
×(147 + p(70 + p(−135 + p(86− 23p+ p3)))))))))))))))))))))).
Remark. To deduce the last equality, we used Wolfram Mathematica 7.
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